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RECENT LEGISLATION
LEGAL PROFESSION-THE ETHICS OF PRACTICE UNDER
PENNSYLVANIA'S PROFESSIONIAL ASSOCIATION ACT
In response to new Treasury Regulations I defining the word "asso-
ciation" for purposes of determining whether an entity is taxable as a
corporation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,2 the Pennsylvania
General Assembly has recently enacted the Professional Association Act.3
By the provisions of this act, persons practicing one of the traditional
professions 4 can form a "professional association" having the corporate
characteristics of continuity of life, centralized management, and a modified
form of free transferability of interests. The purpose of the act is to enable
such persons to organize business entities that will meet the criteria of an
"association" under the new Treasury regulations, so that they may
achieve several important federal income tax benefits, such as those ex-
tended to plans for profit sharing and retirement, pensions, group insurance,
and deferred compensation.5
I. THE NEW TREASURY REGULATIONS
Section 7701(a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines
"corporation" for federal tax purposes merely by specifying that the term
"includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies."
Nowhere in the Code is "association" defined; thus, the definition of this
term has been left to judicial decision 6 and Treasury regulations under
1 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a) (3).
3 Pa. Laws 1961, act 416.4 According to §2(2) of the act, "profession" includes "all occupations, legally
or traditionally designated as professions, and which members thereof by law, tradi-
tion, or ethics, are forbidden to incorporate for the purpose of rendering professional
services, including, but not limited to, architects, attorneys at law, certified public
accountants, chiropractors, dentists, osteopaths, physicians and surgeons." As a
general rule a corporation cannot practice medicine, e.g., People v. United Medical
Servs., 362 I1. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); State ex rel. Beck v. Goldman Jewelery
Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P.2d 995 (1935), or lawfully engage in the practice of law,
e.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d
863 (1958); In the Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15
(1910); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. 1939);
see CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs OF THE AmERICAN BAR AssOcIATIoN, canon 35.
It follows that neither doctors nor lawyers can incorporate to practice their re-
spective professions, since that is not a lawful purpose for a corporation.
5 These benefits are discussed in Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FoanEAm
L. REv. 353 (1958); Lyon, Action in Indiana on Kintner-Type Organizations, 39
TAXES 266 (1961).
6 It has been held that resemblance to the corporate form of carrying on business
rather than the existence of a statutory charter of incorporation determines whether
an entity is taxable as a corporation. Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344,
357-58 (1935). Continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free
transferability of interests are the attributes that distinguish the corporation from
other forms of business association. Id. at 359. However, all of these characteristics
need not be present in any given case, since substantial resemblance to a corporation
(465)
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section 7701(a) (3). Unhappy with the latest judicial decisions and
reluctant to follow them,7 in November 1960 the Treasury Department
published final regulations 8 under section 7701 which, in form, substantially
accept the judicial criteria, but which further elaborate the meaning of
various corporate attributes and introduce into the determination of these
attributes a new emphasis on local law. 9 Although the tests that must be
applied in classifying a business entity are laid down by the Internal
Revenue Code, state law now controls in determining whether a particular
test has been met. This unprecedented incorporation of local law makes it
unlikely that any organization governed by either the Uniform Partnership
Act or the Uniform Limited Partnership Act can meet the standards of an
association taxable as a corporation,10 since a sufficient number of the
characteristics of continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability,
and free transferability of interests cannot be attained under those acts.
If the new regulations are followed by the courts, they will in all probability
deny the tax benefits now gained by nonstatutory professional associations
-the Kintner-type associations. 1
II. TaE AcT
The paramount objective of Pennsylvania's Professional Association
Act is to remove any state-law impediments to the formation of professional
associations taxable as corporations under the new Treasury regulations.'
2
is the determining factor. Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
It has also been consistently held that the status of a particular entity under state
law is not controlling for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. E.g., Poplar Bluff
Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1945). In general, if
an organization looks and acts more like a corporation than any other form, it will
be taxed as such. Bert v. Helvering, supra at 495. The nonstatutory professional
association was recognized as a corporation for tax purposes as a result of the Kintner
cases. United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), affirmlng 107 F. Supp.
976 (D. Mont. 1952); accord, Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex.
1959), 12 ALA. L. REv. 415 (1960) ; 14 Oa.A. L. Rv. 99 (1961).
7The Internal Revenue Service refused to accept United States v. Kintner, supra
note 6, as a guide in subsequent cases. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 598.
Later, it modified this position by ruling "that the fact that an association establishes
a pension plan under section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 . . . is
not determinative of whether such organization will be classified as a partnership
or an association taxable as a corporation." Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL.
886-87.
8 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960) ; see M. Lyons, Comments on the New Regulations
on Associations, 16 TAx L. Ray. 441, 444-47 (1961) ; Rusoff, A Law Firm Pension
Plan?, 37 DicTA 351, 354 (1960).
9 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
10 See Lyon, supra note 5; Lyons, supra note 8; Ray, Corporate Tax Treat-
ment of Medical Clinics Organized as Associations, 39 TAxEs 73 (1961); Rusoff,
supra note 8; Saltz, Associations, 38 TAxEs 187 (1960). Compare Fuller, Taxation
of Louisiana Professional Partnerships as Associations, 35 TurL. L. REv. 723 (1961) ;
Maier & Wild, Taxation of Professional Firms as Corporations, 44 MARQ. L. REV.
127 (1960).
11 This term, coined after the Kintner cases, see note 6 supra, denotes a common-
law association organized with the intent of qualifying as an association taxable as a
corporation.
12 Several other states have passed or are considering legislation designed to
achieve the same result. Some states have adopted association or professional cor-
poration statutes similar to Pennsylvania's; others have amended their Uniform
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In order to accomplish this objective, the act creates a new statutory form
of business association which is subject to neither the Uniform Partnership
Act 13 nor the Uniform Limited Partnership Act 14 and which may possess
enough corporate characteristics to meet the standards of the Treasury
regulations. A professional association may be organized for a term of
years or in perpetuity.' Under section 12 of the act, ownership interests
in an association, evidenced by share certificates, may be transferred to
any third person who is legally authorized to render the services for which
the association was formed.' 6 Sections 5 and 7 require that all associates
subscribe to articles of association and adopt bylaws to govern the affairs
of the organization. Section 8 provides that "all associates shall be eligible
to be employes of the association," and any associate, agent, or employee
who becomes disqualified by law to practice the profession is required by
section 18 to be severed from the employ of the association and to dispose
of any ownership interest in it. Under section 6, the associates must elect
a board of governors, with authority to manage all of the affairs of the
association. Board members need not be associates, although each must
be legally authorized to perform professional services of the sort rendered
by the association. Sections 9 and 10 require the board to establish the
mode and amount of compensation of employees and to provide for the
retention and distribution of earnings. Unlike corporate shareholders,
all members of a professional association, by section 17, are jointly and
severally liable for torts committed by agents and employees of the asso-
ciation and are jointly liable for its debts and other legal obligations.
In short, an association organized under the act will have an objective
to carry on business for joint profit, continuity of life, centralized manage-
ment, and a modified form of free transferability of interests. It will, how-
ever, be unable to limit the liability of its members. The tests of an
association taxable as a corporation under the new Treasury regulations
are apparently met when measured by this law. Indeed, an association
created under the act will closely resemble an example which the Treasury
regulations characterize as "an association for all purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code." 17
Partnership Acts to exclude associations of professional men. See Eber, The Pros
and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 308 (1961);
Maier, Doe't Confuse Kintner-Type Associations with New Professional Corporations,
15 J. TAxATION 248 (1961).
13 PA. STAT. AN. tit. 59, §§ 1-105 (1930).
1 4 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 171-228 (1930).
15 Section 14. And "neither death, bankruptcy, resignation, expulsion, insanity,
retirement, nor transfer or redemption of the interest of any associate shall cause its
dissolution." Ibid.
16Section 12 permits further restrictions to be placed on transfers by associates
if such restrictions are stated in the bylaws and on the ownership certificates. In
most instances an association would probably want to control the admission of new
members. This could be accomplished by requiring that an associate must first offer
his interest to members of the association before transfering it to an outsider. The
Treasury regulations allow this kind of restriction but state that "this modified cor-
porate characteristic will be accorded less significance than if such characteristic
were present in an unmodified form." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (e) (2) (1960).
3.7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g) (1) (1960).
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III. ATTORNEYS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although the statute purports to permit attorneys to take advantage of
the association form,' 8 such legislative permission does not conclusively
determine whether or not attorneys may properly practice law as an
association. In Pennsylvania, regulation of the professional conduct of
members of the bar is within the power of the judicial branch of govern-
ment.'9 Thus, any authoritative decision as to the propriety of attorneys
practicing law in the professional association form must come from the
judiciary. However, since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has ruled
that the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion are the standards to which the conduct of members of the bar must
conform,2 0 certain general guidelines may be found in recent opinions by
the American and Philadelphia Bar Associations. 2
It might be objected that since section 6 of the act requires excess
earnings to be distributed among the associates according to their "propor-
tionate ownership in the association," such a division of fees paid into the
association would violate canon 34, in that the division might not bear any
relationship to individual "service or responsibility." 22 The same canon
could also be violated by having as an associate an attorney who does not
contribute any services to the association. These objections would be
overcome, however, if shares in the association were allocated on the basis
of service and responsibility, much as partners' shares are determined in
a law partnership. Section 7 2 appears to permit an association to provide
in its bylaws for periodic reapportionment of ownership interests if it is
found that there has been a change in the value of any associate's con-
tribution to the association. 24 And section 12 certainly enables an associa-
18 Section 2(2).
'9 Sterling v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 538, 106 A.2d 793 (1954); Hoopes v. Brad-
shaw, 231 Pa. 485, 487, 80 Atl. 1098, 1099 (1911) ; cf. Lewis v. Board of Governance,
316 Pa. 193, 173 Atl. 652 (1934).
20 PA. R. Civ. P. 205.
21 Opinion No. 303 of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
(Nov. 27, 1961); Opinion No. 61-7 of the Committee on Professional Guidance of
the Philadelphia Bar Association, in 145 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Philadelphia)
807 (1961).
22 Canon 34 provides: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except
with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
28 "The associates shall adopt by-laws to regulate the affairs of the professional
association. The by-laws shall provide for . . . a method for determining the
values of the respective interests of the associates, . . . and whatever else the asso-
ciates deem necessary for the successful regulation of the affairs of the association."
2 4 Because the act makes no express provision for reapportionment of shares, the
Philadelphia Bar Association took a more cautious approach, suggesting that unethical
fee-splitting might be avoided if "management of the association paid out all of the
fees, after expenses, as salaries to the associates employed by the association in
proportion to their contribution ... " Opion n No. 61-7 of the Committee on
Professional Guidance, supr note 21, at 810. If the committee meant to excludecapital improvements such as expansion of office facilities from that part of fees which
might be retained to cover "expenses," this solution would seem to impose a severebudgetry straitjacket upon a association of lawyers. On the other hand, if th
committee meant to permit retention of fees for capital improvements, its suggestionwould seem to violate canon 34, insofar as it would permit each associate to have an
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tion to exclude inactive members of the profession.2 5
Canon 35 seeks to ensure preservation of the direct and personal
relationship between attorney and client 26 and prohibits the professional
services of a lawyer from being "controlled or exploited by any lay agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer." 27
This provision was interpreted in a 1950 opinion of the Professional Ethics
Committee of the American Bar Association concerning the ethics of
establishing a common-law or Massachusetts trust within a law firm in
order to take advantage of the pension provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.2 8 The Committee concluded that such action would be unethical,
primarily because the trust would be a lay intermediary in violation of
canon 35.29 It can be argued that in a "professional association" there
would be an intermediary between attorney and client, because section 6
of the act requires that the board of governors be empowered to "manage
all of the affairs of the . . . association." Although the trust situation
can be distinguished in many ways from that of an association formed
under the act,30 the argument that attorney-trustees are a lay intermediary
is certainly applicable to a board of governors. But this argument assumes
that when attorneys are acting as trustees, they are acting in a lay capacity,
not in their capacity as attorneys. Although this premise may be techni-
cally correct, the policy behind canon 35-a desire to prohibit laymen
from possessing any financial interest in or control of the practice of law 81
interest upon dissolution in assets derived from fees, and that interest might come
to bear no relation to the individual services contributed by the associate. It would
seem, therefore, that procedures for reapportionment of shares should be included in
the bylaws, and that such procedures are sufficiently "necessary for the successful
regulation of the affairs of the association" to be valid under section 7 of the act.25 See note 16 supra.
26 "A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility
should be direct to the client. .. ."
27 The canon continues: "A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are indi-
vidual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by
or in the interest of such intermediary. .. "
2S Opinion No. 283 of the ABA Professional Ethics Committee, in 36 A.B.A.J.
870 (1950) ; see Rusoff, supra note 8, at 358.
29 The committee gave several other reasons for its opinion: if the organization
were a true common-law trust, the associates would be shielded from personal lia-
bility; lawyers in the trust would be "masquerading" as a partnership in violation
of canon 33; since ownership could fall into the hands of laymen, there would be a
possibility of laymen receiving compensation for the services of lawyers, in violation
of canon 34. Opinion No. 283 of the ABA Professional Ethics Committee, supra
note 28, at 871. In reaching its conclusion, the committee seems to have been influenced
by the consideration that state law would deem the trust a partnership because of
control retained by the beneficiaries over the trustees; thus it was doubtful whether
the trust would in fact be taxed as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code.
See id. at 870.
30 There would be no limited liability in an association formed under the act.
See § 17. Also there would be no chance of ownership falling into the hands of
laymen. See §§ 3, 12, 13. The lawyers in the trust situation proposed to form a
trust within an existing partnership, but in the case of an association the partner-
ship would be dissolved when the association was formed. Thus, many unethical
features of a trust need not be present in an association organized under the act.
31 See In the Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910);
Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 Fo"nrAm L. REv. 353, 362 (1961).
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-would not seem to be violated if the intermediary consists exclusively of
active members of the bar. The most recent ABA opinion, by similar rea-
soning, concluded that "as long as the centralized management can only be in
lawyers, the existence of centralized management will not result in a viola-
tion of . . . Canon [35]." 2 Nevertheless, it would seem, if the board
of governors assumes to determine what clients the association will
represent, to control the details of a client's cause, and in general to place
itself between individual associates and their clients,3s it would effectively
destroy the direct and personal relationship between attorney and client,
in violation of canon 35, regardless of its being composed exclusively of
lawyers. An association of lawyers, however, could be organized under
the act in such a way as to preserve the present operations and relationships
within the existing law partnership. The existing partnership agreement
could be incorporated into the bylaws of the association so that the board of
governors would merely replace the executive committee or similar manage-
ment group empowered to run the daily affairs of the law firm and execute
its functions, leaving professional decisions to be made by individual as-
sociates. By this means, a professional association of lawyers could
probably be organized in harmony with canon 35.
There is, then, support for the proposition that an association conform-
ing to all of the provisions of the act could be formed consistently with
ethical standards. The act shows a deliberate intention on the part of the
legislature to retain the ethical norms imposed upon practitioners of the
professions.34 However, if it can be assumed that the dominant motivation
to form such an association would be the desire to achieve tax benefits, and
that in organizing such an association attorneys will attempt to follow
closely the new Treasury regulations, it is questionable whether, in
practice, an association of lawyers would meet the ethical standards. Al-
though an association is not a corporation per se, in order to be treated
as a corporation for tax purposes, it must closely resemble one in opera-
tion. 5 An association which operates substantially the same way as does a
law partnership could not meet the Treasury standards, since an association
must have truly centralized management in order to satisfy the Treasury
regulations. 6 An association that does meet this criterion would violate
canon 35, for a board of governors possessed of the power to exercise the
3
2 Opinion No. 303 of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances
(Nov. 27, 1961).
33 Section 6 seems to contemplate that the board would not act in a merely
ministerial capacity, but would have exclusive authority, like the directors of a cor-
poration, to "manage all of the affairs" of the association.
84 See the following sections of the act: §§ 3, 4, 8, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18. See also
Jones, Should Lawyers Incorporate?, 11 HAsT NGs L.J. 150, 153 (1959).
85 See Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935) ; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2
(a) (1) (1960).86 Since there will be only a modified form of free transferability of interests
and no limited liability of associates in an association organized under the act, it is
imperative that the association have centralized management and continuity of life in
order to have more corporate attributes than noncorporate attributes. See Treas.
Reg. §§301.7701-2(a) (2)-(3) (1960).
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kind of centralized management contemplated by the regulations--"a con-
centration of continuing exclusive authority to make independent business
decisions on behalf of the organization which do not require ratification by
members of such organization" ! 3 -would so control and dominate decisions
affecting the practice of law by associates as to destroy the traditional
attorney-client relationship. 8 Unlike many law partnerships in which
specific powers are delegated to one or more partners to act for all the
partners until such powers are withdrawn, the Treasury regulations
demand that all power to make "business decisions" be lodged in the first
instance in the management group and that this authority be incapable of
being withdrawn on the initiative of the associates. After an associate
operating under centralized management of this sort has been assigned
to a case, many of his professional decisions could be countermanded or
modified by the board; the associate would be directly responsible to the
board-rather than to his client-for the manner in which he conducts
the client's affairs. This kind of arrangement clearly contravenes the
mandate of canon 35, that a lawyer's "responsibility should be direct to
the client." Regardless of whether a professional association could success-
fully achieve the status of "corporation" for tax purposes, there is no reason
to ignore the probability that any association of lawyers formed under the
act will attempt to follow the Treasury's suggestions closely. So created, an
association of lawyers could not satisfy the Canons of Professional Ethics.3 9
a7Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3) (1960). "There is no centralization of con-
tinuing exclusive authority to make management decisions, unless the managers have
sole authority to make such decisions. For example, in the case of a corporation or
a trust, the concentration of management powers in a board of directors or trustees
effectively prevents a stockholder or a trust beneficiary, simply because he is a stock-
holder or beneficiary, from binding the corporation or the trust by his acts:' Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (4) (1960).
;s The lawyer-associate could not make many of the decisions seemingly required
by the canons to be made by him alone, since the power of ultimate decision would
rest with the board of governors. See, e.g., canons 8 ("Advising Upon the Merits
of a Client's Cause'), 12 ("Fixing the Amount of the Fee"), 30 ("Justifiable and
Unjustifiable Litigations"), 31 ("Responsibility for Litigation"), 34 ("Division of
Fees"). But see Medical Partnership Ass'ns, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 29 (Pa. Att'y Gen.
Official Opinion, Sept. 27, 1961), discussing whether physicians can form a partnership
association under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 341-461 (1930), as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, §§ 441-42 (Supp. 1960), in conformity with the standards of ethics of
the medical profession. The opinion concluded that it would be ethical for physicians
to form such an association, and stated that the same conclusion would be applicable
to the Professional Association Act. In discussing the nature of the power given to
managers of a partnership association, the opinion said: "In order to satisfy the
requirements of the Medical Practice Act, the bylaws of the association should ex-
plicitly provide that the managers have no authority to interfere with the professional
relationship between any member and his patient or to influence the course of treat-
ment." Id. at 41. And it was asserted that this type of centralized management
"would satisfy the Federal tax regulations." Id. at 42. Perhaps in medical practice,
and certainly in law practice, to exclude all matters pertaining to "the professional
relationship" between an associate and his patient or client seems incompatible with
the notion of centralized management contained in the Treasury regulations. See
note 37 supra.
89 This conclusion is not inconsistent with that of the ABA opinion. In holding
that "centralized management, by lawyers exclusively, . . . does not in and of itself
present any ethical difficulties," Opinion No. 303 of the ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances (Nov. 27, 1961), the committee seemed to be proceeding
upon the premise that the type of centralized management employed would be sub-
19621
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State laws attempting to extend federal tax benefits to local residents
have had a checkered history.40 Pennsylvania's Professional Association
Act, insofar as it applies to lawyers, actually encourages members of the
bar to tread a narrow line between propriety and impropriety.41 Instead of
sanctioning alteration of the traditional forms in which the law has been
practiced, so as to obtain for lawyers some financial benefit under federal
tax laws, the states might do better to reinforce the ancient tradition of
immediate, intimate, and personal relationship between individual attorneys
and their clients, leaving to the federal government 2 whatever tax relief
legislation may seem appropriate.
stantially similar to that now exercised by various partnership management groups.
However, the type of concentration of management authority which the Treasury
regulations demand is in substance very different from that employed in law partner-
ships. See notes 37, 38 .rpra and accompanying text. It is perhaps significant that
the Supreme Court of Florida felt called upon to amend the Code of Ethics governing
Florida attorneys in order to enable members of the Florida bar to practice law in
the corporate form created by the recent Professional Service Corporation Act, Fla.
Laws 1961, ch. 61-64. See In the Matter of the Fla. Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
Since the Florida Code of Ethics is substantially similar to the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics, see id. at 558-59, the action of the Florida court suggests that
an entity organized to correspond to the Treasury regulations' definition of an "asso-
dation" could not satisfy the ABA Canons as they are presently written. Opinion
No. 61-7 of the Committee on Professional Guidance, supra note 21, at 814. The
House of Delegates of the American Medical Association adopted a resolution on
December 5, 1957, permitting "physicians to join together as partnerships, associations
or other lawful groups provided that the ownership and management of the affairs
thereof remain in the hands of licensed physicians." Medical Partnership Ass'n,
supra note 38, at 42 n.21 (1961). The AMA was of the opinion that such action
would not affect physicians' ethical responsibilities, since "the ethical principles of
the A.M.A. apply to the individual physician whether he practices alone or with a
group . . . ." Ibid. The same reasoning might be employed to support the con-
clusion that an association of attorneys resembling a partnership in operation would
be ethical under the Canons of Professional Ethics. However, it was not advanced
in a case where centralized management would destroy the physician-patient or
attorney-client relationship.
40 See Note, 50 CoLum. L. Rgv. 332 (1950). This note discusses the consequenses
of pre-1948 legislation in five states designed to give local residents the income-
splitting advantages of community property, see Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930),
and expresses the hope "that the experience of the new community property jurisdic-
tions will serve as a warning to legislatures throughout the country against the hasty
enactment of laws altering basic social institutions without a thorough understanding
of their consequences." Note, supra at 351.
41 "[Ilt is difficult to see how an organization which has more corporate char-
acteristics than noncorporate characteristics could practice law in a manner consistent
with the best concepts of professional status." Opinion No. 61-7 of the Committee
on Professional Guidance, supra note 21, at 810.42 Congress has recently been urged to enact legislation which will permit self-
employed individuals to participate in tax-deferred retirement plans. See Keogh,
Tax Equity for the Self-Employed, 47 A.B.A.J. 665 (1961) ; Rapp, Pensions for the
Self-Employed: The Treasunry Department-Finance Committee Plan, 16 TAx L. REv.
227 (1961) ; Rapp, The Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short
History of the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, 14 TAx L. Rxv. 55 (1958). Such a proposal
is embodied in the Keogh-Utt bill, H.R. 10, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), passed
by the House of Representatives on June 5, 1961. This bill would treat self-employed
professionals as their own employers and would thereby permit them to set up tax-
favored private retirement plans similar to the qualified pension plans permitted by
INT. Rsv. CODE OF 1954, § 401. Thus, without changing their business form, pro-
fessionals would be enabled to make tax-free contributions to their own pension funds
and required to pay taxes only on retirement benefits actually received in later years.
Though limited to only one aspect of tax equality, pension plans, the Keogh-Utt
bill would extend the principal tax advantage motivating professionals to resort to
associations.
